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33 2 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Rober tson, ^ t a l . v - G e m Insurance Company 
Case No~7~|8^WP 
Lower Court C i v i l No. CV 891505 
Our F i l e No. 740.037 
Dear Mr. B u t l e r : 91-^214-0 
Defendant/Appellee Gem Insurance Company filed its Brief of 
Appellee on March 11, 1991 in the above-referenced matter. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Jackie and Craig Robertson's Reply Brief is 
due on April 15, 1991. Since Gem filed its Appellee's Brief, Gem 
has learned of two United States Supreme Court cases and one Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals case that are particularly relevant to one 
of the main issues of this appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 
24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Gem submits this 
letter citing supplemental authorities, with nine copies. 
The cases are the following: 
1. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 59 U.s.L.W. 4009 (November 27, 
1990); 
2. Inqersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S.Ct. 478 (December 
3, 1990); and 
3. Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Cc^, No. 89-3242 (10th Cir. 
March 5, 1991). 
Pages 7 through 14 of Plaintiffs1 Brief and pages 13 through 
32 of Defendant's Brief, concern the issue of ERISA pre-emption, 
and whether Plaintiffs' causes of action for breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and punitive damages are pre-empted by ERISA, 
as the Lower Court determined in granting Gem's Motion for Partial 
Dismissal below. The cases cited above examine the history and 
scope of ERISA pre-emption with regard to state laws and common law 
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causes of action, where there is an employee welfare benefit plan 
in existence. The Tenth Circuit Court Settles case is particularly 
relevant in that the Tenth Circuit Court affirmed the Federal 
District Court for the District of Kansas' order dismissing 
plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to defendant's motion to 
dismiss, as happened in the case on appeal here. 
A copy of each of the three cases cited above is attached 
hereto for the convenience of the Court. 
We would appreciate your forwarding this citation of 
supplemental authorities on to the Court. Thank you for your 
attention to this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
WILKINS, ORITT & RONNOW 
JRO:jb 
Enclosures 
cc: Jeffery C. Peatross, Esq. (2 copies) 
Jeffrey L. Gabardi, Esq. 
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OPINIONS ANNOUNCED NOVEMBER 27, 1990 
The Supreme Court decided: 
PENSIONS AND BENEFITS—Pre-emption 
Pennsylvania statute that precludes, in any action arising out 
of motor vehicle use, reimbursement from claimant's tort recov-
ery of any benefits paid by "any program, group contract or 
other arrangement," is pre-empted by Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act insofar as it applies to self-funded emplov-
ee welfare beneht plans (FMC Corp v Holhday, No 89-1048) 
Page 4009 
PUBLIC UTILITIES—Federal Power Act 
Section 318 of Federal Power Act, which governs overlapping 
jurisdiction of Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal 
Energy Rt&uA&tocy CQcarcussiou m cegulauau of power compa-
nies under Public Utility Holding Company Act and Federal 
Power Act, specifies that SEC regulation will prevail "with 
respect to" four enumerated categories of parallel agency au-
thority, and phrase "any other subject matter" at end of fourth 
category must be read to modify only those matters covered in 
fourth category, not to create independent category with respect 
to which SEC jurisdiction will prevail, accordingly, Section 318 
does not apply to case in which SEC authorized power company 
to purchase coal from SEC-approved affiliate at price equal to 
affiliate's actual costs and FERC subsequently declared such 
charges to be unreasonable and thus unrecoverable in wholesale 
power rates (Arcadia, Ohio v Ohio Power Co, No 89-1283) 
Page 4015 
F u l l T e x t of O p i n i o n s 
No. 89-1048 
FMC CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. CYNTHIA 
ANN HOLLIDAY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
Syllabus 
No. 89-1048. Argued October 2, 1990-Decided November 27, 1990 
After petitioner FMC Corporation's self-funded health care plan (Plan) 
paid a portion of respondent's medical expenses resulting from an auto-
mobile accident, FMC informed respondent that it would seek re-
imbursement under the Plan's subrogation provision from any recovery 
she realized in her Pennsylvania negligence action against the driver of 
the vehicle in which she was injured. Respondent obtained a declara-
tory judgment in Federal District Court that 5 1720 of Pennsylvania's 
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law—which precludes re-
imbursement from a claimant's tort recovery for benefit payments by a 
NOTICE These opinions arc subject to formal revision before publication 
in the prelimmarv print of the United btates Reports Readers arc requested 
to notif) the Reporter of Decisions Supreme Court of the Lnitcd States. 
Washington DC 20543 o( any typographical or other formal errors in 
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to 
press 
program, group con:ract, or ctner arrangement —prohibits FMC's exer-
cise of suDrogation rights. Tre Court of Appeals affirmed holding :.iat 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), wmch 
applies to employee welfare cenen: plans such as FMC's. Goes not ore-
empt § 1720. 
Held ERISA pre-empt3 the application of § 1720 to ~MC's Plan. 
(a) ERISA's pre-emption cause oroadly estaDhshes as an area of ex-
clusive federal concern the subject of every state law that -eiate[sj :o ' a 
covered employee benefit plan. Althougn the statute's sav _rg clause re-
turns to the States the power :o enforce those state laws tr-a: 'reguiatfe] 
insurance," the deemer clause orovides that a covered plar snail not oe 
"deemed to De an insurance company or other insurer or to oe en-
gaged in tne Dusiness of insurance ' for purposes of state *a vs 'ourDort-
ing to regulate" insurance corDan.es or insurance contracts 
(b) Section 1720 urelate(s] to" an employee oenefit olan witnin *re 
meaning of ERISA's pre-empr.on provision, since it has oo:i a connec-
tion with" and a "reference to" such a plan. See Shaw v Delta Air 
Lint*, Inc , 463 U. S. 85, 96-97 Moreover, although tne re is no dis-
putA that h 172.Q tiT<><gulaxes> ^r^ararvca," ERISA'* c^emex t^us^ d^raon-
strates Congress' dear intent to exclude from the reach or the saving 
clause self-funded ERISA plans oy relieving them from state laws "pur-
porting to regulate insurance " Thus, such plans are exernt iron state 
regulation insofar as it "relates to" them. State laws directed foward 
sucn plans are pre-empted because they relate to an emotovee oenent 
plan out are not "saved" because tr.ey do not regulate insurance State 
laws that directly regulate insurance are "saved" but do not reacn seif-
funded plans Decause the plans may not be deemed to oe insurance com-
panies, other insurers, or engaged in the business of insurance for pur-
poses of such laws. On the other hand, plans that are nsured are 
subject to indirect state insurance regulation insofar as state laws "pur-
porting to regulate insurance" apply to the plans' insurers and tne insur-
ers' insurance contracts. This reading of the deemer clause j consistent 
with Metropolitan Life Ins Co v. Massachusetts, 471 U S 724. 735, 
n. 14, 747, and is respectful of the presumption that Congress does not 
intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state regulation, see Jones v 
Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525, including regulation of the "busi-
ness of insurance," see Metropolitan Life Ins Co v Massachusetts, 
supra, at 742-744. Narrower readings of the deemer clause—which 
would interpret the clause to except from the saving clause only state 
insurance regulations that are pretexts for impinging on core ERISA 
concerns or to preclude States from deeming plans to be insurers only for 
purposes of state laws that apply to insurance as a business, such as laws 
relating to licensing and capitalization requirements —are unsupported 
by ERISA's language and would be fraught with administrative difficul-
ties, necessitating definition of core ERISA concerns and of what consti-
tutes business activity and thereby undermining Congress expressed 
desire to avoid endless litigation over the validity of state act*on and re-
quiring plans to expend funds in such litigation. 
885 F. 2d 79, vacated and remanded 
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, 
C. J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ , 
joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOUTER, J , took no part 
in the consideration or decision of the case. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case calls upon the Court to decide whether the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), SS 
NOTE Where il is deemed desirable, a syllabus ihcadnote) *ill be 
released • • • at the lime ihe opinion ts issued The ssllabui cooiiiuies no 
part ot the opinion of the Court but has been prepared b\ ihe Reporter ol 
Decisions for the convenience of the trader Sec Lntied States Detroit 
Lumber Co 200 U S 321. 337 
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Stat 829, as amended, 29 U S C § 1001 et seq , pre-empts a 
Pennsylvania law precluding employee welfare benefit plans 
from exercising subrogation rights on a claimant's tort 
re:overy 
r 
Petitioner FMC Corporation (FMC), operates the FMC 
Salaried Health Care Plan (Plajp an employee welfare bene-
fit plan within the meaning of ERISA, §3(1), 29 U S C 
§1002(1), that provides health oenefits to FMC employees 
and their dependents The Plan is self funded, it does not 
purcnase an insurance policy from any insurance company m 
order to satisfy its ooligations to its participants Among its 
provisions is a suorogation clause under which a Plan mem-
ber agrees to reimburse the Plan for benefits paid if the mem-
ber recovers on a claim in a haoibt> action against a third 
party 
Respondent, Cynthia Ann Holhday, is the daughter of 
FMC emplo>ee and Plan member Gerald Holhday In 1987, 
sh2 was seriously injured in an automobile accident The 
PI in paid a portion of her medical expenses Gerald Holh-
dav brought a negligence action on behalf of his daughter in 
Pennsylvania state court against the driver of the automooile 
in which she was injured The parties settled the claim 
While the action was pending, FMC notified the Holhdays 
that it would seek reimoursement for the amounts it had paid 
for respondent's medical expenses The Holhdays replied 
that they would not reimburse the Plan, asserting that § 1720 
of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehide Financial Responsibility 
Law, 75 Pa Cons Stat § 1720 (1987), precludes subrogation 
b> FMC Section 1720 states that "[i]n actions arising out of 
the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no 
right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant's tort 
recovery with respect to benefits payable under sec-
tion 1719 " l Section 1719 refers to benefit payments by 
"Wny program, group contract or other arrangement " ' 
Respondent, proceeding in diversity, then sought and re-
ceived a declaratory judgment m Federal District Court that 
Section 1720 of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility 
Law is entitled M[s]ubrogationw and provides 
'In actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, 
th(»re shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant's 
tort recovery with respect to workers' compensation benefits, benefits 
available under section 1711 (relating to required benefits), 1712 (relating 
to availability of benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability of adequate lim-
its) or benefits in lieu thereof paid or payable under section 1719 (relating 
to coordination of benefits) n 
' Section 1719, entitled M[c]oordinauon of benefits," reads 
'(a) General rule —Except for workers' compensation, a policy of insur-
ance issued or delivered pursuant to this subchapter shall be primary 
Any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of bene-
fit.} such as described in section 1711 (relating to required benefits), 1712(1) 
and (2) (relating to availability of benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability 
of adequate limits) shall be construed to contain a provision that all benefits 
provided therein shall be in excess of and not in duplication of any valid and 
collectible first party benefits provided in section 1711, 1712 or 1715 or 
workers' compensation 
u(b) Definition.— As used in this section the terra "program, group con-
tract or other arrangement' includes, but is not limited to, benefits payable 
by a hospital plan corporation or a professional health service corporation 
subject to 40 Pa. C S Ch. 61 (relating to hospital plan corporations) or 63 
(relating to professional health services plan corporations) " 
§ 1720 prohibits FMC's exercise of subrogation rights on Hol-
iday's claim against the driver The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed 885 F 2d 79 (1989) 
The court held that §1720, unless pre-empted bars FMC 
from enforcing its contractual subrogation pro\ision Ac-
cording to the court, ERISA pre-empts §1720 ii ERISA a 
'deemer clause," § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U S C 11144(b)(2)(B) 
exempts the Plan from state subrogation laws The Court of 
Appeals, citing Northern Group Semnces, Inc v \uto Own-
ers Ins Co , 833 F 2d 85 91-94 (CA6 1987), cen denied 
486 U S 1017 (1988), determined that "the aeerrer c'ause 
[was] meant mainly to reach back-door a t te rp ts D> stares *o 
regulate core ERISA concerns in the guise of insurance regu-
lation " 885 F 2d, at 86 Pointing out that the Darties had 
not suggested that the Pennsylvania antisuDrogation la A 
addressed "a core type of ERISA matter wmcn Congress 
sought to protect by the preemption provision ' id at 90 
the court concluded that the Pennsylvania law is not pre-
empted The Third Circuit's holding conflicts with decisiors 
of other Circuit Courts that have construed ERISA s deemer 
clause to protect self-funded plans from ail state insurance 
regulation See, e g , Baxter v Lynn, 886 F 2d 182, 156 
(CA8 1989), Redly v Blue Cross and Blue Shield Unitea or 
Wisconsin, 846 F 2d 416, 425-426 (CA7), cert denied -*S3 
U S 856 (1988) We granted certiorari to resolve this con-
flict, 493 U S (1990), and now reverse 
II 
In determining whether federal law pre-emDts a state stat-
ute, we look to congressional mtent "Tre-emDtion may be 
either express or implied, and "is compelled whether Con 
gress' command is explicitly stated in the statute s language 
or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose ' 
Shaw v Delta Air Lines, Inc , 463 U S 85, 95 (1983) (quot-
ing Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn v De la Cuesta 
458 U S 141, 152-153 (1982), in turn quoting Jones v Rath 
Packing Co , 430 U S 519, 525 (1977)), see also Chevron 
USA Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Iuc 
467 U S 837, 842-843 (1984) ("If the mtent of Congress is 
clear, that is the end of the matter, for the court must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed mtent of Con-
gress" (footnote omitted)) We "begin with the language 
employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary 
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative 
purpose." Park 'N Fly, Inc v Dollar Park and Fly, Inc , 
469 U S 189, 194 (1985) Three provisions of ERISA speak 
expressly to the question of pre-emption 
"Except as provided m subsection (b) of this section 
[the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter 
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any 
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter 
relate to any employee benefit plan." § 514(a), as set 
forth in 29 U S. C § 1144(a) (pre-emption clause) 
"Except as provided m subparagraph (B) [the deemer 
clause], nothing m this subchapter shall be construed to 
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State 
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities" 
§ 514(b)(2)(A), as set forth m 29 U. S. C § 1144(b)(2)(A) 
(saving clause). 
"Neither an employee benefit plan . nor any trust 
established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an 
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust corn-
Published each Tuesday except first Tuesday in September and last Tuesday in December by The Bureau of National Affairs Inc 1231 
Twenty-Fifth Street, N W , Washington D C 20037 Subscription rates (payable in advance) $588 00 first year and S560 00 per year there-
after Second class postage paid at Washington, D C , and at additional mailing offices 
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pany, or investment company or to be engaged in the 
business of insurance or banking for purposes of any 
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance com-
panies, insurance contract, banks, trust companies, or 
investment companies." § 514(b)(2)(B), as set forth in 
29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (deemer clause). 
We indicated in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachu-
setts, 471 U. S. 724 (1985), that these provisions "are not a 
model of legislative drafting." Id., at 739. Their operation 
is nevertheless discernible. The pre-emption clause is con-
spicuous for its breadth. It establishes as an area of exclu-
sive federal concern the subject of every state law that "re-
latefs] to" an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. 
The saving clause returns to the States the power to enforce 
those state laws that "regulat[e] insurance," except as pro-
vided in the deemer clause. Under the deemer clause, an 
employee benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be 
"deemed" an insurance company, an insurer, or engaged in 
the business of insurance for purposes of state laws "purport-
ing to regulate" insurance companies or insurance contracts. 
Ill 
Pennsylvania's antisubrogation law "relate[s] to" an em-
ployee benefit plan. We made clear in SJww v. Delta Air 
Lines, supra, that a law relates to an employee welfare plan 
if it has "a connection with or reference to such a plan." Id., 
at 96-97 (footnote omitted). We based our reading in part 
on the plain language of the statute. Congress used the 
words "'relate to' in § 514(a) [the pre-emption clause] in their 
broad sense." Id., at 98. It did not mean to pre-empt only 
state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit 
plans. That interpretation would have made it unnecessary 
for Congress to enact ERISA § 514(b)(4), 29 U. S. C. 
§ 1144(b)(4), wrhich exempts from pre-emption "generally" ap-
plicable criminal laws of a State. We also emphasized that to 
interpret the pre-emption clause to apply only to state laws 
dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA, such as 
reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary duties, would be incom-
patible with the provision's legislative history because the 
House and Senate versions of the bill that became ERISA 
contained limited pre-emption clauses, applicable only to 
state laws relating to specific subjects covered by ERISA.' 
These were rejected in favor of the present language in the 
Act, "indicating] that the section's pre-emptive scope was as 
broad as its language." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U. S., 
at 98. 
Pennsylvania's antisubrogation law has a "reference" to 
benefit plans governed by ERISA. The statute states that 
"[i]n actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor 
vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimburse-
ment from a claimant's tort recovery with respect to . . . 
benefits . . . paid or payable under section 1719." 75 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 1720 (1987). Section 1719 refers to "[a]ny pro-
gram, group contract or other arrangement for payment of 
benefits." These terms "includfe], but [are] not limited to, 
'The bill introduced in the Senate and reported out of the Committer 
on Labor and Public Welfare would have pre-empted "any and all laws of 
the States and of political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act." S. 4, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess., 5 609(a) (1973). As introduced in the House, the bill that 
became ERISA would have superseded Many and all laws of the Sutes and 
of the political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter 
relate to the fiduciary, reporting, and disclosure responsibilities of persons 
acting on behalf of employee benefit plans." H. R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 
§ 114 (1973). The bill was approved by the Committee on Education and 
Labor in a slightly modified form. See H. R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 
§ 514(a) (1973). 
benefits payable by a hospital plan corporation or a profes-
sional health service corporation." § 1719 (emphasis added). 
The Pennsylvania statute also has a "connection" to 
ERISA benefit plans. In the past, we have not hesitated to 
apply ERISA's pre-emption clause to state laws that risk 
subjecting plan administrators to conflicting state regula-
tions. See, e. g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, supra, at 95-100 
(state laws making unlawful plan provisions that discriminate 
on the basis of pregnancy and^quirjng flans to provide spe-
cific benefits "relate to" benef.: plans); Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 523-526 (1981) (state law 
prohibiting plans from reducing benefits by amount of work-
ers' compensation awards "relates] to" employee benefit 
plan). To require plan providers to design their programs in 
an environment of differing State regulations would compli-
cate the administration of na::onwide plans, producing in-
efficiencies that employers might offset with decreased bene-
fits. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1. 
10 (1987). Thus, where a "patchwork scheme of regulation 
would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit pro-
gram operation," we have applied the pre-emption clause to 
ensure that benefit plans will be governed by only a single set 
of regulations. Id., at 11. 
Pennsylvania's antisubrogation law prohibits plans from 
being structured in a manner requiring reimbursement in the 
event of recovery from a third parry. It requires plan pro-
viders to calculate benefit levels in Pennsylvania based on ex-
pected liability conditions that differ from those in States 
that have not enacted similar antisubrogation legislation. 
Application of differing state subrogation laws to plans would 
therefore frustrate plan administrators' continuing obligation 
to calculate uniform benefit levels nationwide. Accord. 
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., supra (state statute 
prohibiting offsetting worker compensation payments against 
pension benefits pre-empted since statute would force em-
ployer either to structure all benefit payments in accordance 
with state statute or adopt different payment formulae for 
employers inside and outside State). As we stated in Fort 
Halifax, "[t]he most efficient way to meet these (adminis-
trative] responsibilities is to establish a uniform adminis-
trative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures 
to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits." 
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, supra, at 9. 
There is no dispute that the Pennsylvania law falls within 
ERISA's insurance saving clause, which provides, u[e]xcept 
as provided in [the deemer clause], nothing in this sub-
chapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person 
from any law of any State which regulates insurance," 
§ 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
Section 1720 directly controls the terms of insurance con-
tracts by invalidating any subrogation provisions that they 
contain. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 740-741. It 
does not merely have an impact on the insurance industry; it 
is aimed at it. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 
41, 50 (1987). This returns the matter of subrogation to 
state law. Unless the statute is excluded from the reach of 
the saving clause by virtue of the deemer clause, therefore, it 
is not pre-empted. 
We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA 
plans from state laws that "regulat[e] insurance" within the 
meaning of the saving clause. By forbidding States to deem 
employee benefit plans "to be an insurance company or other 
insurer . . . or to be engaged in the business of insurance." 
the deemer clause relieves plans from state laws "purporting 
to regulate insurance." As a result, self-funded ERISA 
plans are exempt from state regulation insofar as that regu-
lation "relate[s] to" the plans. State laws directed toward 
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the plans are pre-empted because they relate to an employee 
benefit plan but are not "saved" because they do not regulate 
insurance. State laws that directly regulate insurance are 
"saved" but do not reach self-funded employee benefit plans 
because the plans may not be deemed to be insurance compa-
nies, other insurers, or engaged in the business of insurance 
for purposes of such state laws. On the other hand, em-
ployee benefit plans that are insured are subject to indirect 
state insurance regulation. An insurance company that in-
sures a plan remains an insurer for purposes of state laws 
"purporting to regulate insurance" after application of the 
deemer clause. The insurance company is therefore not re-
lieved from state insurance regulation. The ERISA plan is 
consequently bound by state insurance regulations insofar as 
they apply to the plan's insurer. 
Our reading of the deemer clause is consistent with Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra. That case in-
volved a Massachusetts statute requiring certain self-funded 
benefit plans and insurers issuing group-health policies to 
plans to provide minimum mental-health benefits. Id., at 
734. In pointing out that Massachusetts had never tried to 
enforce the portion of the statute pertaining directly to bene-
fit plans, we stated, "[i]n light of ERISA's 'deemer clause,' 
which states that a benefit plan shall not 'be deemed an insur-
ance company" for purposes of the insurance saving clause, 
Massachusetts has never tried to enforce [the statute] as 
applied to benefit plans directly, effectively conceding that 
such an application of [the statute] would be pre-empted by 
ERISA's pre-emption clause." Id., at 735, n. 14 (citations 
omitted). We concluded that the statute, as applied to in-
surers of plans, was not pre-empted because it regulated 
insurance and was therefore saved. Our decision, we ac-
knowledged, "results in a distinction between insured and 
uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regula-
tion while the latter are not." Id., at 747. "By so doing, we 
merely give life to a distinction created by Congress in the 
'deemer clause,' a distinction Congress is aware of and one it 
has chosen not to alter." Ibid, (footnote omitted). 
Our construction of the deemer clause is also respectful of 
the presumption that Congress does not intend to pre-empt 
areas of traditional state regulation. See Jones v. Rath 
Packing Co., 430 U. S., at 525. In the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq., Congress provided that the 
"business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, 
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate 
to the regulation or taxation of such business." 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1012(a). We have identified laws governing the "business 
of insurance" in the Act to include not only direct regulation 
of the insurer but also regulation of the substantive terms of 
insurance contracts. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, supra, at 742-744. By recognizing a distinction be-
tween insurers of plans and the contracts of those insurers, 
which are. subject to direct state regulation, and self-insured 
employee benefit plans governed by ERISA, which are not, 
we observe Congress' presumed desire to reserve to the 
States the regulation of the "business of insurance." 
Respondent resists our reading of the deemer clause and 
would attach to it narrower significance. According to the 
deemer clause, "[n]either an employee benefit plan . . . nor 
any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to 
be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust com-
pany, or investment company or to be engaged in the busi-
ness of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any 
State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insur-
„ eri wuwovm 9Q TT S_ C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) 
would interpret the deemer clause to except from the saving 
clause only state insurance regulations that are pretexts for 
impinging upon core ERISA concerns. The National Con-
ference of State Legislatures et al. as amici curiae in support 
of respondent, offer an alternative interpretation of the 
deemer clause. In their view, the deemer clause precludes 
States from deeming plans to be insurers only for purposes of 
state laws that apply to insurance" as a"business, such as laws 
relating to licensing and capitalization requirements. 
These views are unsupported by ERISA's language. 
Laws that purportedly regulate insurance companies or in-
surance contracts are laws having the "appearance of" reg-
ulating or "intending" to regulate insurance companies or 
contracts. Black's Law Dictionary 1236 (6th ed. 1990). 
Congress' use of the word does not indicate that it directed 
the deemer clause solely at deceit that it feared state legis-
latures would practice. Indeed, the Conference Report, in 
describing the deemer clause, omits the word "purporting," 
stating, "an employee benefit plan is not to be considered as 
an insurance company, bank, trust company, or investment 
company (and is not to be considered as engaged in the busi-
ness of insurance or banking) for purposes of any State law 
that regulates insurance companies, insurance contracts, 
banks, trust companies, or investment companies." H. R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 383 (1974). 
Nor, in our view, is the deemer clause directed solely at 
laws governing the business of insurance. It is plainly di-
rected at "any law of any State purporting to regulate in-
surance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust compa-
nies, or investment companies." § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U. S. C. 
§ 1144(b)(2)(B). Moreover, it is difficult to understand why 
Congress would have included insurance contracts in the 
pre-emption clause if it meant only to pre-empt state laws re-
lating to the operation of insurance as a business. To be 
sure, the saving and deemer clauses employ differing lan-
guage to achieve their ends—the former saving, except as 
provided in the deemer clause, "any law of any State which 
regulates insurance" and the latter referring to "any law of 
any State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] in-
surance contracts." We view the language of the deemer 
clause, however, to be either coextensive with or broader, 
not narrower, than that of the saving clause. Our rejection 
of a restricted reading of the deemer clause does not lead to 
the deemer clause's engulfing the saving clause. As we have 
pointed out, supra, at 9, the saving clause retains the inde-
pendent effect of protecting state insurance regulation of in-
surance contracts purchased by employee benefit plans. 
Congress intended by ERISA to "establish pension plan 
regulation as exclusively a federal concern." Alessi v. Ray-
bestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S., at 523 (footnote omitted). 
Our interpretation of the deemer clause makes clear that if a 
plan is insured, a State may regulate it indirectly through 
regulation of its insurer and its insurer's insurance contracts; 
if the plan is uninsured, the State may not regulate it. As a 
result, employers will not face "'conflicting or inconsistent 
State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.'" SJiaw 
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S., at 99 (quoting remarks of 
Sen. Williams). A construction of the deemer clause that ex-
empts employee benefit plans from only those state regula-
tions that encroach upon core ERISA concerns or that apply 
to insurance as a business would be fraught with adminis-
trative difficulties, necessitating definition of core ERISA 
concerns and of what constitutes business activity. It would 
therefore undermine Congress* desire to avoid "endless liti-
gation over the validity of State action," see 120 Cong. Rec. 
29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits), and instead lead to em-
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In view of Congress' clear intent to exempt from direct 
state insurance regulation ERISA employee benefit plans, 
we hold that ERISA pre-empts the application of § 1720 of 
Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law 
to the FMC Salaried Health Care Plan. We therefore va-
cate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit and remand the case for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE SOUTER took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of this case. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
The Court's construction of the statute draws a broad and 
illogical distinction between benefit plans that are funded by 
the employer (self-insured plans) and those that are insured 
by regulated insurance companies (insured plans). Had 
Congress intended this result, it could have stated simply 
that "all State laws are pre-empted insofar as they relate to 
any self-insured employee plan." There would then have 
been no need for the "saving clause" to exempt state insur-
ance laws from the pre-emption clause, or the "deemer 
clause." which the Court today reads as merely reinjecting 
into the scope of ERISA's pre-emption clause those same ex-
empted state laws insofar as they relate to self-insured plans. 
From the standpoint of the beneficiaries of ERISA plans — 
who after all are the primary beneficiaries of the entire statu-
tory program—there is no apparent reason for treating self-
insured plans differently from insured plans. Why should a 
self-insured plan have a right to enforce a subrogation clause 
against an injured employee while an insured plan may not? 
The notion that this disparate treatment of similarly situated 
beneficiaries is somehow supported by an interest in uniform-
ity is singularly unpersuasive. If Congress had intended 
such an irrational result, surely it would have expressed it in 
straightforward English. At least one would expect that the 
reasons for drawing such an apparently irrational distinction 
would be discernible in the legislative history, or in the litera-
ture discussing the legislation. 
The Court's anomalous result would be avoided by a cor-
rect and narrower reading of either the basic pre-emption 
clause or the deemer clause. 
I 
The Court has endorsed an unnecessarily broad reading of 
the words "relate to any employee benefit plan" as they are 
used in the basic pre-emption clause of § 514(a). I acknowl-
edge that this reading is supported by language in some of 
our prior opinions. It is not, however, dictated by any prior 
holding and I am persuaded that Congress did not intend this 
clause to cut nearly so broad a swath in the field of state laws 
as the Court's expansive construction will create. 
The clause surely does not pre-empt a host of general rules 
of tort, contract, and procedural law that relate to benefit 
plans as well as to other persons and entities. It does not, 
for example, pre-empt general state garnishment rules inso-
far as they relate to ERISA plans. Mackey v. Lanier Col-
lection Agency & Service, Inc.f 486 U. S. 825 (1988). More-
over, the legislative history of the provision indicates that 
throughout most of its consideration of pre-emption, Con-
gress was primarily concerned about areas of possible over-
lap between federal and state requirements. Thus, the bill 
that was introduced in the Senate would have pre-empted 
state laws insofar as they "relate to the subject matters regu-
lated by this Act,"1 and the House bill more specifically 
identified state laws relating "to the fiduciary, reporting, and 
disclosui'e responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of em-
ployee benefit plans.": Although the compromise that pro-
duced the statutoiy language "relate to any employee benefit 
plan" is not discussed in the legislative history, the final ver-
sion is perhaps best explained as an editorial amalgam of the 
two bills rather than as a major expansion of the section's 
coverage. 
When there is ambiguity in a statutory provision pre-
empting state law, we should apply a strong presumption 
against-the invalidation of well-settled, generally applicable 
state rules. In my opinion this presumption played an im-
portant role in our decisions in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. 
Coyne, 482 U. S. 1 (1987), and Mackey v. Lanier Collection 
Agency & Service, Inc., supra. Application of that pre-
sumption leads me to the conclusion that the pre-emption 
clause should apply only to those state laws that purport to 
regulate subjects regulated by ERISA or that are inconsist-
ent with ERISA's central purposes. I do not think Congress 
intended to foreclose Pennsylvania from enforcing the anti-
subrogation provisions of its state Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Act against ERISA plans— most certainly it 
did not intend to pre-empt enforcement of that statute 
against self-insured plans while preserving enforcement 
against insured plans. 
II 
Even if the "relate to" language in the basic pre-emption 
clause is read broadly, a proper interpretation of the care-
fully drafted text of the deemer clause would caution against 
finding pre-emption in this case. Before identifying the key 
words in that text, it is useful to comment on the history sur-
rounding enactment of the deemer clause. 
The number of self-insured employee benefit pians grew 
dramatically in the 1960's and early 1970's.1 The question 
whether such plans were, or should be, subject to state regu-
lation remained unresolved when ERISA was enacted. It 
was, however, well recognized as early as 1967 that requiring 
self-insured plans to comply with the regulatory require-
ments in state insurance codes would stifie their growth: 
"Application of state insurance laws to uninsured plans 
would make direct payment of benefits pointless and in 
most cases not feasible. This is because a welfare plan 
would have to be operated as an insurance company in 
order to comply with the detailed regulatory require-
ments of state insurance codes designed with the typical 
operations of insurance companies in mind. It presum-
ably would be necessary to form a captive insurance 
company with prescribed capital and surplus, capable of 
obtaining a certificate of authority from the insurance 
department of all states in which the plan was 'doing 
business,' establish premium rates subject to approval 
by the insurance department, issue policies in the form 
approved by the insurance department, pay commissions 
and premium taxes required by the insurance law, hold 
and deposit reserves established by the insurance de-
partment, make investments permitted under the law, 
and comply with all filing and examination requirements 
of the insurance department. The result would be to re-
lS. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 609(a) (1973), reprinted a: 1 Legislative 
History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (Com-
mittee Print compiled by the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare) 93, 1S6 (1976) (Leg. Hist.). 
XH. R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 114 (1973); 1 Leg. Hist. 51. 
'See Comment, State Regulation of Noninsured Employee Welfare 
Benent Plans, 62 Geo. L. J. 339, 340 (1973). 
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introduce an insurance company, which the direct pay-
ment plan was designed to dispense with. Thus it can 
be seen that the real issue is not whether uninsured 
plans are to be regulated under state insurance laws, but 
whether they are to be permitted." Goetz, Regulation 
of Uninsured Employee Welfare Plans Under State In-
surance Laws, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 319, 320-321 (emphasis 
in original). 
In 1974 while ERISA was being considered in Congress, 
the first state court to consider the applicability of state in-
surance laws to self-insured plans held that a self-insured 
plan could not pay out benefits until it had satisfied the licens-
ing requirements governing insurance companies in Missouri 
and thereby had subjected itself to the regulations contained 
in the Missouri insurance code. Missouri v. Monsanto Co., 
Cause No. 259774 (St. Louis Cty. Cir. Ct.f Jan. 4, 1973), 
revU 517 S. W. 2d 129 (Mo. 1974). Although it is true that 
the legislative history of ERISA or the deemer clause makes 
no reference to the Missouri case, or to this problem—in-
deed, it contains no explanation whatsoever of the reason for 
enacting the deemer clause—the text of the clause itself 
plainly reveals that it was designed to protect pension plans 
from being subjected to the detailed regulatory provisions 
that typically apply to all state-regulated insurance compa-
nies—laws that purport to regulate insurance companies and 
insurance contracts. 
The key words in the text of the deemer clause are 
"deemed," "insurance company," and "purporting."* It pro-
vides that an employee welfare plan shall not be deemed to be 
an insurance company or to be engaged in the business of in-
surance for the purpose of determining whether it is an entity 
that is regulated by any state law purporting to regulate in-
surance companies and insurance contracts. 
Pennsylvania's insurance code purports, in so many words, 
to regulate insurance companies and insurance contracts. It 
governs the certification of insurance companies, Pa. Stat. 
Ann., Tit. 40, §400 (Purdon 1971), their minimum capital 
stock and financial requirements to do business, § 386 (Pur-
don 1971 and Supp. 1990-1991), their rates, e. g.f §532.9 
(Purdon 1971) (authorizing Insurance Commissioner to regu-
late minimum premiums charged by life insurance compa-
nies), and the terms that insurance policies must, or may, in-
clude, e. g„ §510 (Purdon 1971 and Supp. 1990-1991) (life 
insurance policies), §753 (Purdon 1971) (health and accident 
insurance policies). The deemer clause prevents a State 
from enforcing such laws purporting to regulate insurance 
companies and insurance contracts against ERISA plans 
merely by deeming ERISA plans to be insurance companies. 
But the fact that an ERISA plan is not deemed to be an in-
surance company for the purpose of deciding whether it must 
comply with a statute that purports to regulate "insurance 
contracts" or entities that are defined as "insurance compa-
nies" simply does not speak to the question whether it must 
nevertheless comply with a statute that expressly regulates 
subject matters other than insurance. 
There are many state laws that apply to insurance compa-
nies as well as to other entities. Such laws may regulate 
some aspects of the insurance business, but do not require 
one to be an insurance company in order to be subject to their 
'Section 514(bX2XB), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 1144(bX2)(B), 
provides: 
"Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under 
such a plan, shall be deemtd to be an insumnce company or other insurer, 
bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the busi-
ness of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purport-
ing to regulate ivsumnce companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust 
terms. Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibil-
ity Act is such a law. The fact that petitioner's plan is not 
deemed to be an insurance company or an insurance contract 
does not have any bearing on the question whether peti-
tioner, like all other persons, must nevertheless comply with 
the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act. 
If one accepts the Court's broad reading of the "relate to" 
language in the basic pre-emption*clause* the answer to the 
question whether petitioner must* comply with state laws 
regulating entities including but not limited to insurance com-
panies depends on the scope of the saving clause.4 In this 
case, I am prepared to accept the Court's broad reading of 
that clause but it is of critical importance to me that the cate-
gory of state laws described in the saving clause is broader 
than the category described in the deemer clause. A state 
law "which regulates insurance," and is therefore exempted 
from ERISA's pre-emption provision by operation of the sav-
ing clause, does not necessarily have as its purported subject 
of regulation an 'insurance company" or an activity that is 
engaged in by persons who are insurance companies. 
Rather, such a law may aim to regulate another matter alto-
gether, but also have the effect of regulating insurance. The 
deemer clause, by contrast, reinjects into the scope of 
ERISA pre-emption only those state laws that "purport to" 
regulate insurance companies or contracts—laws such as 
those which set forth the licensing and capitalization require-
ments for insurance companies or the minimum required pro-
visions in insurance contracts. While the saving clause thus 
exempts from the pre-emption clause all state laws that have 
the broad effect of regulating insurance, the deemer clause 
simply allows pre-emption of those state laws that expressly 
regulate insurance and that would therefore be applicable to 
ERISA plans only if States were allowed to deem such plans 
to be insurance companies. 
Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act 
fits into the broader category of state laws that fall within the 
saving clause only. The Act regulates persons in addition to 
insurance companies, and affects subrogation and indemnity 
agreements that are not necessarily insurance contracts. 
Yet because it most assuredly is not a law "purporting" to 
regulate any of the entities described in the deemer clause— 
"insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust com-
panies, or investment companies," the deemer clause does 
not by its plain language apply to this state law. Thus, al-
though the Pennsylvania law is exempted from ERISA's pre-
emption provision by the broad saving clause because it "reg-
ulates insurance," it is not brought back within the scope of 
ERISA pre-emption by operation of the narrower deemer 
clause. I therefore would conclude that petitioner is subject 
to Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility 
Act. 
I respectfully dissent. 
H. WOODRUFF TURNER, Pittsburgh, Pa. (CHARLES KELLY. 
PATRICK J. MCELHINNY, KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART. 
and W. RONALD COOPER, on the briefs) for petitioner. DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, Deputy Solicitor General (KENNETH W. STARR. Sol. 
Gen., CHRISTOPHER J. WRIGHT, Asst. to the Sol. Gen., ROB-
ERT P. DAVIS. Sol. of Labor, ALLEN H. FELDMAN, Assoc. Sol., 
STEVEN J. MANDEL, Dpty. Assoc. Sol., and MARK S. FLYNN. 
Labor Dept. attv., on the briefs) for U.S. as amicus curiae; CHARLES 
ROTHFELD, Washington, D.C. (THOMAS G. JOHNSON. DAVID 
A. CICOLA, and BARBOR and CICOLA, on the briefs) for 
respondent. 
1
 Section 514(bX2XA) of ERISA, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. 
§ 1144(b)(2XA). provides: 
"Except as provided in subparagraph (B) nothing in this subchapter shall 
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State 
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its provisions, so far as to punish a cnme 
not enumerated in the statute, because it 
is of equal atrocity, or of kindred charac-
ter, with those which are enumerated." 
United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 
76, 96, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820). 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully 
dissent. 
INGERSOLL-RAND 
COMPANY, Petitioner 
v. 
Perry iMcCLENDON. 
No. 89-1298, 
Argued Oct 9, 1990. 
Decided Dec. 3, 1990. 
Employee brought wrongful discharge 
action against his former employer. The 
183rd District Court, Harris County,Xamar 
McCorkle, J., entered summary judgment 
in favor of employer, and employee appeal-
ed. The Houston Court of Appeals, 14th 
District, affirmed, 757 S.W.2d 816, and em-
ployee again appealed. The Texas Su-
preme Court reversed and-remanded, 779 
S.W.2d 69. Certiorari was granted. The 
Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor, held that 
ERISA preempted the employee's state law 
wrongful discharge claim based on allega-
tion that his discharge was based on his 
employer's desire to avoid making contribu-
tions to his pension fund. 
Reversed. 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Ste-
aric ininpH in nart 
1. Master and Servant =^^ 34 
States <s=>18.45 
ERISA preempted employee's state 
law wrongful discharge dafm based on al-
legation that his discharge was based on 
his employer's desire to avoid making con-
tributions to his pension fund. Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
§§ 2 et seq., 502(a), 510, 514, 514(a), (cXD, 
as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 et seq., 
1132(a), 1140, 1144, 1144(a), (cXD. 
2. States <s=>!8.11 
To discern Congress' intent in ruling 
on preemption issue, Supreme Court exam-
ines explicit statutory language and struc-
ture and purpose of statute. • 
3. Pensions <£=>22 
States <s=>18.51 
State law may "relate to" benefit plan, 
and thereby be preempted under ERISA, 
even if law is not specifically designed to 
affect such plans, or effect is only indirect 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974, § 514(a), (cXl), as amended, 29 
U.S.C.A. § 1144(a), (cXD. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Pensions ^=22 
States <S=*18.51 
Preemption is not precluded simply be-
cause state law is consistent with ERISA's 
substantive requirements. Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
§ 514(a), (cXl), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1144(a), (cXD. 
5. Master and Servant <&=>34 
States <s=>18.45 
Claim that employer wrongfully dis-
charged employee primarily to avoid con-
tributing to or paying benefits under em-
ployee's pension fund "relates to" ERISA-
covered plan within meaning of ERISA's 
preemption provision and is therefore 
preempted. Employee Retirement Income 
INGERSOLL-RAND CO, v. McCLENDON 
Cite as 111 S.Ct. 478 (1990) 479 
Security Act of 1974, § 514(a), as amended, 
29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a). 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
6. Pensions $=>22 
States <$=>18.51 
Provision of ERISA governing scope 
of its preemption provision expanded defini-
tion of "state" to include state agencies 
and instrumentalities whose actions would 
not otherwise be considered state law, and 
did not limit preemption to state laws af-
fecting plan terms, conditions, or adminis-
tration. Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974, §§ 3(10), 514(a), (c)(2), 
as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1002(10), 
1144(a), (cX2). 
7. Master and Servant <3»34 
States <$=>18.45 
Even if ERISA did not expressly 
preempt employee's state law wrongful dis-
charge claim based on allegation that he 
was discharged because his employer 
wished to avoid paying into pension plan, 
claim was impliedly preempted by ERISA 
provision prohibiting interference with at-
tainment of any right under pension plan. 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974, §§ 502(a), (aX3), (e), 510, 514(a), as 
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1132(a), (aX3), (e), 
1140, 1144(a). 
8. Pensions «=>22 
States «=*18,51 
When it is clear or may fairly be as-
sumed that activities which_state purports 
to regulate are protected by provision of 
ERISA prohibiting interference with attain-
ment of rights under pension plan, due 
regard for federal enactment requires that 
state jurisdiction must yield. Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
§§ 502(a), 510, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1132(a), 1140. 
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Re-
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the 
9. Pensions <s=>22 
States «»18.51 
Not only is ERISA provision giving 
plan participants civil action to redress vio-
lations of ERISA exclusive remedy for vin-
dicating rights protected by provision pro-
hibiting interference with attainments of 
rights under pension plan, there is no basis 
for limiting ERISA actions onLy to those 
which seek pension benefits. Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
§§ 502(a), 510, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1132(a), 1140. 
Syllabus * 
After petitioner company fired respon-
dent McClendon, he filed a wrongful dis-
charge action under various state law tort 
and contract theories, alleging that a princi-
pal reason for his termination was the com-
pany's desire to avoid contributing to his 
pension fund. The Texas court granted the 
company summary judgment, and the State 
Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that 
McClendon's employment was terminable 
at will. The State Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded for trial, holding that public 
policy required recognition of an exception 
to the employment-at-wiU doctrine.' There-
fore, recovery would be permitted in a 
wrongful discharge action if the plaintiff 
could prove that "the principal reason for 
his termination was the employer's desire 
to avoid contributing to or paying benefits 
under the employee's pension fund"' In 
distinguishing federal cases holding similar 
claims pre-empted by the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
the court reasoned that McClendon was 
seeking future lost wages, recovery for 
mental anguish, and punitive damages 
rather than lost pension benefits. 
Held: ERISA's explicit language and 
its structure and purpose demonstrate a 
congressional intent to pre-empt a state 
common law claim that an employee was 
unlawfully discharged to prevent his attain-
reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 
200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 
499. 
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ment of benefits under an ERISA-covered 
plan. Pp. 482-486. 
(a) The cause of action in this case is 
expressly pre-empted by § 514(a) of 
ERISA, which broadly declares that that 
statute supersedes all state laws (including 
decisions having the effect of law) that 
"relate to" any covered employee benefit 
plan. In order to prevail on the cause of 
action, as formulated by the Texas Su-
preme Court, a plaintiff must plead, and 
the trial court must find, that an ERISA 
plan exists and the employer had a pension-
defeating motive in terminating the em-
ployment Because the existence of a plan 
is a critical factor in establishing liability, 
and the trial court's inquiry must be direct-
ed to the p)an, this judicially created cause 
of action "relatefs] to" an ERISA plan. Cf. 
Mockey v. Lanier Collection Agency & 
Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 828, 108 S.Ct 
2182, 2184, 100 L.Ed.2d 836. Id., at 841, 
108 S.Ct, at 2191, and Fort Halifax Pack-
ing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 12, 23, 107 
S.Ct 2211, 2217-18, 2223-24, 96 L.EoL2d 1 
distinguished. In arguing that the plan is 
irrelevant to the cause of action because all 
that is at issue is the employer's improper 
motive, McClendon misses the point, which 
is that under the state court's analysis 
there simply is no cause of action if there 
is no plan- Similarly unavailing is McClen-
don's argument that § 514(cX2>—which de-
fines "State" to include any state instru-
mentality purporting to regulate the terms 
and conditions of covered plans—causes 
§ 514(a) to pre-empt only those state laws 
that affect plan terms, conditions, or ad-
ministration and not those that focus on 
the employer's termination decision. That 
argument misreads § 514(cX2) and conse-
quently misapprehends its purpose of ex-
panding ERISA's general definition of 
"State" to "include" state instrumentali-
ties whose actions might not otherwise be 
considered state law for pre-emption pur-
poses; would render § 514(a)'s "relate to" 
language superfluous, since Congress need 
only have said that "all" state laws would 
ho nrp-emDted; and is foreclosed by this 
828, and n. 2, 829, 108 S.Ct, at 2184, and n. 
2, 2185. Pre-emption here is also sup-
ported by § 514(a)'s goal of ensuring uni-
formity in pension law, since .allowing state 
based actions like the one-at issue might 
subject plans and plan sponsors to conflict-
ing substantive requirements developed by 
the courts of each jurisdiction. Pp. 482-
485. 
(b) The Texas cause of action is also 
pre-empted because it conflicts directly 
with an ERISA cause of action. McClen-
don's claim falls squarely within ERISA 
§ 510 which prohibits the discharge of a 
plan participant "for the purpose of inter-
fering with [his] attainment of any right 
. . . under the plan." However, that in 
itself does not imply pre-emption of state 
remedies absent "special features" war-
ranting pre-emption. See, e.g., English v. 
General Electric Co., 496 U.S. , , 
110 S.Ct 2270, , 110 L.Ed.2d 65. Such 
a "special featurfe]" exists in the form of 
§ 502(a), which authorizes a civil action by 
a plan participant to enforce ERISA's or 
the plan's terms, gives the federal district 
courts exclusive jurisdiction of such ac-
tions, and has been held to be the exclusive 
remedy for rights guaranteed by ERISA, 
including those provided by § 510, Pilot 
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.SL 41, 52, 
54-55, 107 S.Ct 1549, 1555-56, 1556-57, 95 
L.Ed.2d 39. Thus, the lower court's at-
tempt to distinguish this case as not one 
within ERISA's purview is without merit 
Moreover, since there is no basis in 
§ 502(a)'s language for limiting ERISA ac-
tions to only those which seek "pension 
benefits," it is clear that the relief request-
ed here is well within the power of federal 
courts; the fact that a particular plaintiff 
is not seeking recovery of pension benefits 
is no answer to a pre-emption argument. 
Pp. 484-486. 
779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), reversed. 
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion 
for a unanimous Court with respect to 
Parts I and II-B, and the opinion of the 
^ -L . ^ u ^cru^t tn p a r t li-A, in which 
INGERSOLL-RAND CO. r. McCLENDON 
O U M 111 S.CX 471 (1W0) 481 
REHNQUIST, CJ., and WHITE, SCALIA, 
KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. 
Hollis T. Hurd, Pittsburgh, Pa., for peti-
tioner. 
Christopher J. Wright, Washington, D.C. 
for the U.S., as amicus curiae, in support of 
the petitioner, by special leave of Court-
John W. Tavormina, Houston, Tex., for 
respondent 
Justice O'CONNOR delivered the 
opinion of the Court** 
This case presents the question whether 
the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat 829, as 
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., pre-
empts a state common law claim that an 
employee was unlawfully discharged to 
prevent his attainment of benefits under a 
plan covered by ERISA. 
I 
Petitioner Ingersoll-Rand employed re-
spondent Perry McClendon as a salesman 
and distributor of construction equipment 
In 1981, after McClendon had worked for 
the company for nine years and eight 
months, the company fired him citing a 
companywide reduction in force. McClen-
don sued the company in Texas state court, 
alleging that his pension would have vested 
in another four months and that a principal 
reason for his termination was the compa-
ny's desire to avoid making contributions 
to his pension fund. McClendon did not 
realize that pursuant to applicable regula-
tions, see 29 CFR § 2530.200t>-4 (1990) 
(break-in-service regulation), he had al-
ready been credited with sufficient service 
to vest his pension under the plan's 10-year 
requirement. McClendon sought compen--
"Justice MARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN, and 
Justice STEVENS join Parts I and II-B of this 
opinion. 
t See, e.g.t Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F. 2d 586 
(CA1 1989) (ERISA pre-empts state wrongful 
discharge actions premised on employer inter-
ference with the attainment of rights under em-
ployee benefit plans); Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F. 
satory and punitive damages under various 
tort and contract theories; he did not as-
sert any cause of action under ERISA. 
After a period of discovery, the company 
moved for, and obtained; summary judg-
ment on all claims. The State Court of 
Appeals affirmed, holding that McClen-
don's employment was terminable at will. 
757 S.W.2d 816 (1988). 
In a 5 to 4 decision, the Texas Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded for trial. 
The majority reasoned that notwithstand-
ing the traditional employment-at-will doc-
trine, public policy imposes certain limita-
tions upon an employer's power to dis-
charge at-will employees. Citing Tex.Rev. 
Civ.StatAnn., Title HOB (Vernon 1988 
pamphlet), and § 510 of ERISA, the majori-
ty concluded that "the state has an interest 
in protecting employees' interests in pen-
sion plans." 779 S.W.2d 69, 71 (1989). As 
support the court noted that "[t]he very 
passage of ERISA demonstrates the great 
significance attached to income security for 
retirement purposes/' Ibid Accordingly, -
the court held that under Texas law a 
plaintiff could recover in a, wrongful dis-
charge action if he established that "the 
principal reason for his termination was the 
employer's desire to avoid contributing to 
or paying benefits under the employee's 
pension fund." Ibid. The court noted that 
federal courts had held similar claims pre-
empted by ERISA, but.-distinguished the 
present case on the basis that McCtendon 
was "not seeking lost pension benefits but 
[was] instead seeking future lost wages, 
mental anguish and punitive damages as a 
result of the wrongful discharge." Id., at 
71, n. 3 (emphasis in original). 
Because this issue has divided state and 
federal courts/ we granted certiorari, 494 
2d 631 (CA3 1989) (same); Sorosky v. Burroughs 
Corp., 826 F.2d 794 (CA9 1987) (same). Accord. 
Conaway v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., — 
W.Va. , 358 S.E.2d 423 (1986). Contra, K 
Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 ?2d 
1364 (1987); Hovey v. Lutheran Medical Center, 
516 F^upp. 554 (EDNY 1981); Savodnik v. Kor 
vettes, Inc., 4SS F.Supp. 822 (EDNY 1980). 
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U.S. , 110 S.Ct 1804, 108 L.Ed.2d 935 
(1990), and now reverse. 
II 
[1] "ERISA is a comprehensive statute 
designed to promote the interests of em-
ployees and their beneficiaries in employee 
benefit plans," Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 103 S.Ct 2890, 2896, 
77 LEd.2d 490 (1983). 'The statute impos-
es participation, funding, and vesting re-
quirements on pension plans. It also sets 
various uniform standards, including rules 
concerning reporting, disclosure, and fidu-
ciary responsibility, for both pension and 
welfare plans." Id, at 91, 103 S.Ct at 
2896 (citation omitted). As part of this 
closely integrated regulatory system Con-
gress included various safeguards to pre-
clude abuse and "to completely secure the 
rights and expectations brought into being 
by this landmark reform legislation." 
S.Rep. No. 93-127, p. 36 (1973). Prominent 
among these safeguards are three provi-
sions of particular relevance to this case: 
§ 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144, ERISA's broad 
pre-emption provision; § 510, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1140, which proscribes interference with 
rights protected by ERISA; and § 502(a), 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), a " 'carefully integrat-
ed' " civil enforcement scheme that "is one 
of the essential tools for accomplishing the 
"stated purposes of ERISA." Pilot Life 
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 US. 41, 52, 54, 
107 S.Ct 1549, 1555, 1556-57, 95 LJEtL2d 
39 (1987). 
[2] We must decide whether these pro-
visions, singly or in combination, pre-empt 
the cause of action at issue -in this case. 
"[T]he question whether a certain state ac-
tion is pre-empted by federal law is one of 
congressional intent The purpose of Con-
gress is the ultimate touchstone/ " A His-
Ckalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U. S. 202, 
208, 105 S.Ct 1904, 1909-10, 85 L.Ed.2d 
206 (1985) (internal quotation omitted) 
(quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 
U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct 1185, 1189-90, 55 
L.Ed.2d 443 (1978)). To discern Congress' 
language and the structure and purpose of 
the statute. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 
498 U.S. , , 111 S.Ct 403, 407, 
— L.Ed.2d (1990),.-(cittirg. Shaw v. 
Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, 463 U.S., at 
95, 103 S.Ct, at 2898-99). Regardless of 
the avenue we follow—whether explicit or 
implied pre-emption—this state law cause 
of action cannot be sustained. 
A 
Where, as here, Congress has expressly 
included a broadly worded pre-emption pro-
vision in a comprehensive statute such as 
ERISA, our task of discerning congression-
al intent is considerably simplified. In 
§ 514(a) of ERISA, as set forth in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(a), Congress provided: 
"Except as provided in subsection (b) 
. of this section, the provisions of this sub-
chapter and subchapter III of this chap-
ter shall supersede any and all State 
laws insofar as they may now or hereaf-
ter relate to any employee benefit plan 
described in section 1003(a) of this title 
and not exempt under section 1003(b) of 
this title/' 
'The pre-emption clause is conspicuous 
for its breadth." FMC Corp., supra, — 
U.S., at , 111 S.Ct, at 407. Its "delib-
erately expansive" language was "de-
signed to 'establish pension plan regulation 
as exclusively a federal coDcem.':"- Pilot 
Life, supra, 481 UAt at 46, 107 S.Ct, 1552 
(quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 
Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523, 101 S.Ct 1895, 
1906, 68 LEd.2d 402 (1981)). The key to 
§ 514(a) is found in the words "relate to." 
Congress used those words in their broad 
sense, rejecting more limited pre-emption 
language that would have made the clause 
"applicable only to state laws relating to 
the specific subjects covered by ERISA." 
Shaw, supra, 463 U.S., at 98, 103 S.Ct, at 
2900-01. Moreover, to underscore its in-
tent that § 514(a) be expansively applied, 
Congress used equally broad language in 
sla-fminrr +h* " S h i t e taw" t h a t WOuld b e 
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pre-empted. Such laws Include "all laws, 
decisions, rules, regulations, or other State 
action having the effect of law." 
§ 514(cXD, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(cXD. 
[3,4] "A law 'relates to' an employee 
benefit plan, in the normal sense of the 
phrase, if it has a connection with or refer-
ence to such a plan." Shaw, supra, at 
9&-97, 103 S.Ct, at 2900. Under this 
"broad common-sense meaning," a state 
law may "relate to" a benefit plan, and 
thereby be pre-empted, even if the law is 
not specifically designed to affect such 
plans, or the effect is only indirect Pilot 
Life, supra, 481 U.S., at 47, 107 S.Ct, at 
1552-53. See also Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., supra, 451 U.S., at 525, 
101 S.Ct, at 1907. Pre-emption is also not 
precluded simply because a state law is 
consistent with ERISA's substantive re-
quirements. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739, 105 S.Ct 
2380, 2388-89, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985). 
Notwithstanding its breadth, we have 
recognized limits to ERISA's pre-emption 
clause. In Mackey v. Lanier Collection 
Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 108 
S.Ct 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988), the 
Court held that ERISA did not pre-empt a 
State's general garnishment statute, even 
though it was applied to collect judgments 
against plan participants. Id, at 841, 108 
S.Ct, at 2191. The fact that collection 
might burden the administration of a plan 
did not, by itself, compel pre-emption. 
Moreover, under the plain language of 
§ 514(a) the Court has held that only state 
laws that relate to benefit plans are pre-
empted. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. 
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 23,107 S.Ct 2211, 2223-
24, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). Thus, even though 
a state law required payment of severance 
benefits, which would normally fall within 
the purview of ERISA, it was not pre-empt-
ed because the statute did not require the 
establishment or maintenance of an ongo-
ing plan. Id, at 12, 107 S.Ct, at 2217-18. 
Neither of these limitations is applicable 
to this case. We are not dealing here with 
a renerallv aDDlicable statute that makes 
no reference to, or indeed functions irre-
spective of, the existence of an ERISA 
plan. Nor is the cost of defending this 
lawsuit a mere administrative burden. 
Here, the existence of a pension plan is a 
critical factor in establishing liability under 
the State's wrongful discharge law. As a 
result, this cause of action relates not 
merely to pension benefits, but to the es-
sence of the pension plan itself. 
[5] We have no difficulty in concluding 
that the cause of action which the Texas 
Supreme Court recognized here—a claim 
that the employer wrongfully terminated 
plaintiff primarily because of the employ-
er's desire to avoid contributing to or pay-
ing benefits under the employee's pension 
fund—"relatefs] to" an ERISA-covered 
plan within the meaning of § 514(a), and is 
therefore pre-empted. 
"[W]e have virtually taken it for granted 
that state laws which are 'specifically de-
signed to affect employee benefit plans' are 
pre-empted under § 514(a)." Mackey, su-
pra, 486 U.S., at 829, 108 S.Ct, at 2185. In 
Mackey the statute's express reference to 
ERISA plans established that it was so 
designed; consequently, it was pre-empted. 
The facts here are slightly different but 
the principle is the same: The Texas cause 
of action makes specific reference to, and 
indeed is premised on, the existence of a 
pension plan. In the words of the Texas 
court, the cause of action "allows recovery 
when the plaintiff proves that the principal 
reason f DT his termination ^aa the empicry-
er's desire to avoid contributing to or pay-
ing benefits under the employee's pension 
fund" 779 S.W.2d, at 71. Thus, in order 
to prevail, a plaintiff must plead, and the 
court must find, that an ERISA plan exists 
and the employer had a pension-defeating 
motive in terminating the employment 
Because the court's inquiry must be direct-
ed to the plan, this judicially created cause 
of action "relatefs] to" an ERISA plan. 
McClendon argues that the pension plan 
is irrelevant to the Texas cause of action 
because all that is at issue is the employ-
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er's improper motive to avoid its pension 
obligations. The argument misses the 
point, which is that under the Texas court's 
analysis there simply is no cause of action 
if there is no plan. 
[6] Similarly unavailing is McClendon's 
argument that § 514(a) is limited by the 
narrower language of § 514(cX2) which 
provides: 
"The term 'State' includes a State, any 
political subdivisions thereof, or any 
agency or instrumentality of either, 
which purports to regulate, directly or 
indirectly, the terms and conditions of 
employee benefit plans covered by this 
subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(cX2). 
McClendon argues that § 514(cX2)'s lim-
iting language causes § 514(a) to pre-empt 
only those state laws that affect plan 
terms, conditions, or administration. Since 
the cause of action recognized by the Texas 
court does not focus on those items but 
rather on the employer's termination deci-
sion, McClendon claims that there can be 
no pre-emption here. 
The flaw in this argument is that it mis-
reads § 514(cX2) and consequently misap-
prehends its purpose. The ERISA defini-
tion of "State" is found in § 3(10), which 
defines the term as "any State of the Unit-
ed States, the District of Columbia, Puerto 
- Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, 
Guam, Wake Island, and the Canal Zone." 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(10). Section 514(cX2) ex-
pands, rather than restricts, that definition 
for pre-emption purposes in order to "in-
clude" state agencies and instrumentali-
ties whose actions might not otherwise be 
considered state law. Had-Congress in-
tended to restrict ERISA's pre-emptive ef-
fect to state laws purporting to regulate 
plan terms and conditions, it surely would 
not have done so by placing the restriction 
in an adjunct definition section while using 
the broad phrase "relate to" in the pre-
emption section itself. Moreover, if 
§ 514(a) were construed as McClendon 
urges, the "relate to" language would be 
superfluous—Congress need only have said 
that "all" state laws would be pre-empted 
Moreover, our precedents foreclose this ar-
gument In Mackey the Court held that 
ERISA pre-empted a Georgia garnishment 
statute that excluded from, garnishment 
ERISA plan benefit&T'"Mackey~ supra, 486 
U.S., at 828, and n. 2/829, 108 S.Ct, at 
2184, and n. 2, 2185. Such a law clearly did 
not regulate the terms or conditions of 
ERISA-covered plans, and yet we found 
pre-emption. Mackey demonstrates that 
§ 514(a) cannot be read so restrictively. 
The conclusion that the cause of action in 
this case is pre-empted by § 514(a) is sup-
ported by our understanding of the pur-
poses of that provision. Section 514(a) was 
intended to ensure that plans and plan 
sponsors would be subject to a uniform 
body of benefit law; the goal was to mini-
mize the administrative and financial bur-
den of complying with conflicting directives 
among States or between States and the 
Federal Government. Otherwise, the inef-
ficiencies created could work to the detri-
ment of plan beneficiaries. FMC Corp., 
498 U.S., at , 111 S.Ct, at 408 (citing 
Fort Halifax, 482 U.S., at 10-11, 107 S.Ct, 
at 2216-17); Shaw, 463 U.S., at 105, and n. 
25, 103 S.Ct, at 2904, and n. 25. Allowing 
state based actions like the one at issue 
here would subject plans and plan sponsors 
to burdens not unlike those that Congress 
sought to foreclose through § 514(a). Par-
ticularly disruptive fa the potential for con-
flict in substantive law. It is foreseeable 
that state courts, exercising their common 
law powers, might develop different sub-
stantive standards applicable to the same 
employer conduct, requiring the tailoring 
of plans and employer conduct to the pecu-
liarities of the law of each jurisdiction. 
Such an outcome is fundamentally at odds 
with the goal of uniformity that Congress 
sought to implement 
B 
[7] Even if there were no express pre-
emption in this case, the Texas cause of 
action would be pre-empted because it con-
flicts directly with an ERISA cause of ac-
INGERSOLI^RAND CO. v. McCLENDON 
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tion. McClendon's claim falls squarely 
withm the ambit of ERISA § 510, which 
provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to 
discharge, fine, suspend, expel, disci-
pline, or discriminate against a partici-
pant or beneficiary for exercising any 
right to which he is entitled under the 
provisions of an employee benefit plan 
. . . or for the purpose of interfering 
with the attainment of any right to 
which such participant may become en-
titled under the p lan . . . . " 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1140 (emphasis added). 
By its terms § 510 protects plan partici-
pants from termination motivated by an 
employer's desire to prevent a pension 
from vesting. Congress viewed this sec-
tion as a crucial part of ERISA because, 
without it, employers would be able to cir-
cumvent the provision of promised bene-
fits. S.Rep. No. 93-127, pp. 35-36 (1973); 
H.R.Rep. No. 93-533, p. 17 (1973). We 
have no doubt that this claim is prototypi-
cal of the kind Congress intended to cover 
under § 510. 
"[T]he mere existence of a federal regu-
latory or enforcement scheme," however, 
even a considerably detailed one, "does not 
by itself imply pre-emption of state reme-
dies." English v. General Electric Co., 
496 U.S. , , 110 S.Ct 2270, 2279, 
110 L.E<L2d 65 (1990). Accordingly, "'we 
must look for special features warranting 
pre-emption/" Ibid (quoting Hillsbor-
ough County v. Automated Medical Lab-
oratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719,105 S.Ct 
2371, 2378, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)). 
Of particular relevance in this inquiry is 
§ 502(a)—ERISA's civil enforcement mech-
anism. That section as set forth in 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3), (e), provides, in perti-
nent part: 
"A civil action may be brought— 
"(3) by a participant . . . (A) to enjoin 
any act or practice which violates any 
provision of this subchapter or the terms 
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appro-
priate equitable relief (i) to redress such 
violations or (ii) to enforce anv provisions 
of this subchapter or the terms of the 
p\an; 
"(eXl) Except for actions under sub-
section (aXIXB) of this section, the dis-
trict courts of the United States shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil ac-
tions under this subchapter brought by 
. . . a participant" (Emphasis added.) 
In Pilot Life we examined this section at 
some length and explained that" Congress 
intended § 502(a) to be the exclusive reme-
dy for rights guaranteed under ERISA, 
including those provided by § 510: 
"[TJhe detailed provisions of § 502(a) 
set forth a comprehensive civil enforce-
ment scheme that represents a careful 
balancing of the need for prompt and fair 
claims settlement procedures against the 
public interest in encouraging the forma-
tion of employee benefit plans. The poli-
cy choices reflected in the inclusion of 
certain remedies and the exclusion of 
others under the federal scheme would 
be completely undermined if ERISA-plan 
participants and beneficiaries were free 
to obtain remedies under state law that 
Congress rejected in ERISA. The six 
carefully integrated civil enforcement 
provisions found in § 502(a) of the stat-
ute as finally enacted . . . provide strong 
evidence that Congress did not intend to 
authorize other remedies that it simply 
forgot to incorporate expressly.' " 481 
U.S., at 54, 107 S.Ct, at 1556 (quoting 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146, 105 S.Ct 
3085, 3092, 87 L.Ed.2d 96 (1985)). 
It is clear to us that the exclusive reme-
dy provided by § 502(a) is precisely the 
kind of " 'special featur[e]' " that " 'war-
rants] pre-emption'" in this case. Eng-
lish, supra, 496 U.S., at , 110 S.Ct, at 
2279; see also Automated Medical, supra, 
471 U.S., at 719, 105 S.Ct, at 2378. As we 
explained in Pilot Life, ERISA's legislative 
history makes clear that "the pre-emptive 
force of § 502(a) was modeled on the exclu-
sive remedv provided bv § 301 of the Labor 
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Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 
61 Stat 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185." 481 U.S., at 
52, 107 S.Ct, at 1555-56; id., at 54-55, 107 
S.Ct, at 1556-57 (citing H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 
93-1280, p. 327 (1974)). "Congress was 
well aware that the powerful pre-emptive 
force of § 301 of the LMRA displaced" all 
state-law claims, "even when the state ac-
tion purported to authorize a remedy un-
available under the federal provision." Pi-
lot Life, 481 U.S., at 55, 107 S.Ct, at 1557. 
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, v. Taylor, 
481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct 1542, 95 LEd.2d 55 
(1987), we again drew upon the parallel 
between § 502(a) and § 301 of the LMRA 
to support our conclusion that the pre-emp-
tive effect of § 502(a) was so complete that 
an ERISA pre-emption defense provides a 
sufficient basis for removal of a cause of 
action to the federal forum notwithstand-
ing the traditional limitation imposed by 
the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Id., at 
64-67, 107 S.Ct, at 1546-$. 
[8] We rely on this same evidence in 
concluding that the requirements of con-
flict pre-emption are satisfied in this case. 
Unquestionably, the Texas cause of action 
purports to provide a remedy for the viola-
tion of a right expressly guaranteed by 
§ 510 and exclusively enforced by § 502(a). 
Accordingly we hold that " '[wjhen it is 
clear or may fairly be assumed that the 
activities which a State purports to-regu-
late are protected" by § 510 of ERISA, 
"due regard for the federal enactment re-
quires that state jurisdiction must yield'" 
Cf. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic 
Chef Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409, n. 8, 108 S.Ct 
1877, 1883, n. 8, 100 L.EdJ2d 410 (1988). 
[9] The preceding discussion also re-
sponds to the Texas court's attempt to dis-
tinguish this case as not one within 
ERISA's purview. Not only is § 502(a) the 
exclusive remedy for vindicating 
§ 510-protected rights, there is no basis in 
§ 502(a)'s language for limiting ERISA ac-
tions to only those which seek "pension 
benefits." It is clear that the relief re-
quested here is well within the power of 
* * -i —.,_*„ 4.^  nmvi^o fYm<u>fiuenUv. it 
is no answer to a pre-emption argument • 
that a particular plaintiff is not seeking 
recovery of pension benefits. 
The judgment of the Texas Supreme 
Court is reversed. 
It is so ordered 
Robert S. MINNICK, Petitioner 
v, 
MISSISSIPPI. 
No. 89-6332. 
Argued Oct 3, 1990. 
Decided Dec. 3, 1990. 
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit 
Court, Lowndes County, Mississippi, Lester 
F. Williamson, J., of two counts of capital 
murder, and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court of Mississippi, 551 So.2d 77, af-
firmed, and certiorari was granted. The 
Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, held that 
where accused had requested and been pro-
vided counsel, reinitiation of interrogation 
in interview which accused was compelled 
to attend without counsel was impermissi-
ble. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Justice Scalia filed dissenting opinion 
in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. 
Justice Souter did not participate. 
1. Criminal Law e=»412.2(4), 517.2(1), 641.-
3(6) 
Fifth Amendment protection against 
reinitiation of questioning of accused who 
has requested assistance of counsel is not 
terminated or suspended when suspect has 
consulted with an attorney; officials may 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas 
Philip J. Adams, Jr. of Uatson, Ess ; Marshall & Enggas; Kansas City, Missouri 
(Dwight D. Sutherland; Jr. of Uatson, Ess, Marshall & Enggas, Olathe, Kansas, 
with him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellant. 
Anthony F. Rupp of Shughart, Thompson & Kilroy, P.C., Overland Park, Kansas 
(Thomas G. Kokoruda of Shughart, Thompson & Kilroy, P.C., Kansas City, 
Missouri, and Guy E. McGaughey, Jr. of McGaughey & McGaughey, Ltd., 
Lawrenceville, Illinois, with him on the brief) for Defendant-Appellee. 
Before MOORE, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 
EBEL, Circuit Judge. 
*1 Plaintiff Patricia Joanne Settles brouqht suit in the United States 
District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging that defendant Golden Rule 
Insurance Company's actions in terminating her husband's insurance coverage 
caused him to have a heart attack and die. Jurisdiction is based on diversity 
of citizenship. Plaintiff's cause of action specifically alleged state law 
claims of breach of contract, the tort of outrage, fraudulent denial of 
insurance coverage, and wrongful death. The district court, in response to 
defendant's motion to dismiss, held that the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) preempted plaintiff's state law claims and dismissed the 
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. [FN11 
Arguing that ERISA does not preempt her state law claims, plaintiff appeals the 
district court's order dismissing her cause of action against Golden Rule. We 
aff i rm. 
BACKGROUND 
We recite the facts as they are alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. In 
1984, plaintiff's husband, William L. Settles, was employed as an accounting 
clerk for the Long Motor Corporation (Long Motor) of Lenexa, Kansas. As an 
employment benefit, Mr. Settles was insured under a group policy issued by 
defendant which provided both life and health insurance. Under the group 
insurance policy, Long Motor paid a monthly premium to defendant and was 
required to give advance written notice to defendant if it intended to 
terminate coverage of an employee. 
On October 17, 1986, Mr. Settles was advised by a representative of defendant 
that his health insurance coverage had been terminated. However, on October 
22, 1986, Mr. Settles was told by an agent of defendant that his health 
insurance coverage had not been terminated and that he had effectively 
exercised an extension of his health insurance coverage. On October 24, 1986. 
Mr. Settles was notified by defendant that it had unilaterally terminated his 
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health insurance coverage effective October 7, 1986. Plaintiff alleges that as 
a direct consequence of defendant's actions in terminating her husband's health 
insurance, he became severely depressed and suffered a heart attack on October 
24, 1986. As a result of the heart attack, Mr. Settles died on October 29, 
19S6. 
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging breach of contract, the tort 
of outrage, fraudulent denial of insurance coverage, and wrongful death under 
Kansas law. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss-, arguing both that ERISA 
preempted plaintiff's state law claims, and alternatively that plaintiff had 
failed to state a claim under Kansas Law. The district court granted 
defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that ERISA preempted plaintiff's claim. 
Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 715 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Kan. 1989). Arguing 
that there were insufficient facts before the district court for it to find 
that ERISA applied to Long Motor's employee benefit plan and that ERISA does 
not preempt her wrongful death claim, plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her 
cause of action. 
DISCUSS ION 
*2 We review de novo the granting of a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim for which relief can be granted, and we presume that the 
allegations o't the complaint ara true. See Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 
F.2d 975, 978 (10th Ci r. 1986). In reviewing the dismissal, we must determine 
whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support her claim. Id. 
A. Whether ERISA Preemption Can Be Raised as a Defense in this Case. 
ERISA applies only to benefit plans or re red by employers engaged in interstate 
commerce. See 29 U.S.C. s 1003(a)(1). On appeal, plaintiff first argues that 
ERISA cannot be applied to this case because there was no evidence before the 
district court which proved that Long Motor was engaged in business affecting 
interstate commerce. The defendant has the burden of proving the preemption 
defense. See Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 492 n.4 
(9th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989). However, because 
plaintiff's complaint pleads ample facts to support the conclusion that Long 
Motor participated in business affecting interstate commerce, we find that 
plaintiff conceded that issue. [FN2] 
Plaintiff also argues that because she brought her action in diversity and did 
not raise any claims under ERISA in her complaint, we should look only to her 
complaint to establish jurisdiction. However, in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 
v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987), the Court held that an action alleging 
only state law claims is removable to federal court if it gives rise to the 
defense of ERISA preemption. The Court explained that "tolne corollary of the 
well-pleaded complaint rule developed in the case law ... is that Congress may 
so completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this 
select group of claims is necessarily federal in character." Id. See also 
lngersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 59 U.S.L.W. 4033 (1990). Plaintiff's 
complaint alleged sufficient facts for the district court to determine whether 
it gave rise to the defense of ERISA preemption. The district court did not 
err in considering whether plaintiff's claims were preempted by ERISA. 
B. Whether ERISA Preempts Plaintiff's Wrongful Death Claim. 
Because the defense of ERISA preemption was properly considered by the 
district court, we must now determine whether the district court properly held 
that ERISA preempted plaintiff's wrongful death claim under Kansas law. 
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Section 514(a) of ERISA states that: 
"Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section; the provisions of this 
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State 
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan 
described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt untte'r *~sec t fon 1003(b) 
of this title." 
29 Li.S.C. s 1144(a) (emphasis added). In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 
U.S. 41 ; 48 (1987), the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempts state common law 
causes o^ action that assert improper processing of claims under a benefit plan 
regulated by ERISA. In so holding, the Court emphasized that ERISA's 
preemption provision is not limited to state laws specifically designed to 
affect employee benefit plans. The Court noted that the preemption provision 
is "deliberately expansive/' id. at 46; and that the statutory "phrase 'relate 
to1 [ils given its broad common-sense meaning." Id. at 47 ; quoting Shaw v. 
Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1983). The Court has specifically stated 
that a law relates to a benefit plan "if it has a connection with or reference 
to such a plan." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts; 471 U.S. 724 ; 
739 (1985) ; quoting Shaw; 463 U.S. at 97. The Court in Ingerso11-Rand Co. v. 
McClendon, 59 U.S.L.U. 4033 (1990) once again emphasized that preemption 
under s 514(a) must be interpreted expansively. There it held that s 514 (a ) 
preempted a claim that an employer wrongfully terminated an employee in order 
to avoid contributing to; or paying benefits under; an employee pension fund. 
*3 The Tenth Circuit has given a similarly broad reading to the phrase 
"relate to" and has found that common law tort and breach of contract claims 
are preempted by ERISA if the factual basis of the cause of action involves an 
employee benefit plan. See ; e.g.; Kelley v. Sears; Roebuck and Co., 882 F.2d 
453 (10th Cir. 1989); Straub v. Western Union Telegraph; 851 F.2d 1262 (10th 
Cir. 1988), Other circuits have likewise held that common law tort and 
contract claims may be preempted by ERISA. See; e.g.; Pane v. RCA Corp.; 868 
F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1989); Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng. Beneficial Ass'n, 
857 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1988). 
However; ERISA does not preempt claims that are only tangentially involved 
with a benefit plan. See Shaw; 463 U.S. at 100 n.21; Clark v. Coats & Clark, 
Inc.; 865 F.2d 1237; 1243-44 (11th Cir. 1989): see also Ethridge v. Harbor 
House Restaurant; 861 F.2d 1389; 1404 (9th Cir. 1988): Giardieflo v. Balboa 
Ins. Co.; 837 F.2d 1566, 1571 n.8 (11th Cir. 1988) (ERISA preemption "does not 
extend to every state law claim that, however remotely; factually involves an 
employee benefit plan,"). In Clark, the court held that Clark's claim of 
wrongful discharge was not preempted because the complaint: 
"alludes to conduct which was proximate tor even concurrent) in time to the 
alleged ERISA violation; but wholly remote in content. ... In its present 
form; the complaint makes no statement which ties together the tort claim and 
the ERISA claim in such a way that one 'relates to1 the other in the statutory 
sense-. " 
Clark, 865 F.2d at 1243-44 (emphasis in original). 
The present case is distinguishable from Clark and those other cases that held 
state law claims not preempted by ERISA because here the in jury a 1 leged was a 
direct result of the termination of plan benefits and cannot be characterized 
as "wholly remote" from the benefit plan. See, e.g., Farlow v. Union Cent. 
Life. Ins. Co., 874 F.2d 791, 794 (11th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing Clark 
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because in Farlow the "alleged conduct is intertwined with the refusal to pay 
benefi ts" ) . 
The factual basis for each of plaintiff's state law claims directly concerns 
the alleged improper administration of the benefit plan. Although plaintiff is 
not seeking benefits under the insurance policy; her claims require a finding 
that defendant wrongfully terminated ftr. Settles' insurance coverage. 
Therefore, the claims relate to the employee benefit plan. Plaintiff alleges 
in her compla int tha t: 
"(als a direct result of the defendants' termination of insurance and breach 
of the insurance contract, decedent Willi am L. Settles became severely 
emotionally distressed, suffered extreme mental anguish and was caused to 
suffer [a heart attack] ." 
R. Doc. 1 at P 16; see also id. at P 32, 44, 53. |«je hold that, because 
plaintiff's claims "relate to" an employee benefit plan covered by ERISA, they 
are preempted by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. s 1144(a) (s 514(a) of ERISA), 
*4 Plaintiff argues that even if her other claims are preempted by ERISA, 
her wrongful death claim is not preempted. However, because Kansas' wrongful 
death statute limits causes of actions to those that the decedent could have 
brought had he lived, plaintiff's wrongful death claim must be analyzed like 
any other state law claim. The wrongful death statute in Kansas provides that: 
"If the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or the omission of 
another, an action may be maintained for the damages resulting therefrom if the 
former might have maintained the action had he or she lived, in accordance with 
the provisions of this article, against the wrongdoer, or his or her personal 
representative if he or she is deceased." 
Kan. Stat. Ann. s 60-1901 (emphasis added). Had Mr. Settles survived the 
wrongful termination of his benefits, any claim that he could have brought 
based on the wrongful termination of his benefits would have been barred bv 
ERISA because it would have related to his employee benefit plan. Therefore, 
because the decedent could not have brought suit under these facts, plaintiff's 
wrongful death claim is similarly barred. 
Plaintiff's argument that the legislative history of ERISA demonstrates that 
Congress did not intend ERISA to preempt state law wrongful death actions is 
flawed. First plaintiff relies in large part on a House Report which was 
prepared subsequent to the original passage of s 514(a) and which discussed a 
House Bill which ultimately was not adopted by Congress, See Appellant's 8r. 
at 12-13, citing H.R. Rep. No. 801, 100th Cong,, 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 63 
(1988). Therefore, the legislative history cited by plaintiff does not give a 
clear indication of congressional intent in drafting s 514(a). See Consumer 
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 
(1980) (subsequent statements sre not clear indication of original 
congressional intent). Moreover, the Supreme Court in Pilot Life reviewed the 
legislative history of ERISA when it found that the preemption provision of 
ERISA.was written to be "deliberately expansive." 481 U.S. at 45-47. One 
commentator explains that: 
"the Court has shown deep sensitivity to congressional intent regarding 
preemption. Alessi, Shaw, and Pilot Life demonstrate that ERISA must prevail 
where any potential conflict between ERISA and a state statute or state law 
cause of action exists, or where a state statute or state law cause of action 
may in any way hinder the development of a uniform body of federal labor law 
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governing employee benefit plans." 
Steinman, Federal Preemption: The Labor Management Relations Act and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 1988 Ann. Surv. of Am. L. 739, 
777 (footnotes omitted). Plaintiff's interpretation of the legislative history 
is overly restrictive and conflicts with the Supreme Lour t ' s *££.adi_ng~ o f the 
legislative history. Therefore; we reject plaintiff's legislative history 
argument. 
*5 Plaintiff also argues that because 29 U.S.C.s 1132(a)(3)(B) authorizes 
the courts to use "other appropriate equitable relief" to redress ERISA 
violations; the court should allow state wrongful death claims as a form of 
equitable relief. Plaintiff's reading of s 1132(a)(3)(G) is not persuasive. 
Giving courts flexibility in granting relief should not be confused with giving 
courts power to e'jade the broad preemption provision enacted by Congress. The 
Supreme Court in Pilot Life held that s 1132(a) is "the exclusive vehicle for 
actions by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper 
processing of a claim for benefits; and that varying state causes of action for 
claims within the scope of [s 1132(a) ] would pose an obstacle to the purposes 
and objectives of Congress." 4Q1 U.S. at 52. In Massachusetts Mutual Life ins. 
Co. v. Russell. 473 U.S. 134, 146; 147 (1985), the Court explained that 
Congress had created an "interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent 
remedial scheme" which the Court is "reluctant to tamper with." If we were to 
read s 1132(a)(3) as permitting plaintiff's state wrongful death action, we 
would be tampering unnecessarily with the remedial scheme designed by 
Congress. Cf. Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1297 (5th Cir. 
1989) (s 1132(a)(3)VB) does not permit the creation of an ERISA cause of action 
based on an oral contract). Therefore, s 1132(a)(3)(B) cannot be read as 
permitting plaintiff's wrongful death claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the facts asserted in support of plaintiff's state law claims, 
including her wrongful death claim, directly relate to an employee benefit plan 
covered by ERISA, plaintiff's state law claims are preempted by s 514(a) of 
ERISA. CFN33 Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court's June 8, 1939 order 
dismissing plaintiff's claims against defendant Golden Rule Insurance Company. 
FNl/The district court dismissed the cause of action only as against 
Golden Rule Insurance Company and entered a final judgment pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 54(b). Therefore, the present appeal only addresses whether the 
cause of action against Golden Rule was properly dismissed. 
Plaintiff's complaint also listed Jim Toyne Insurance, Inc., as a 
defendant. The district court retains jurisdiction of the cause of action 
against Jim Toyne Insurance, Inc. On September 21, 1989, the district court 
stayed the proceedings against Jim Toyne Insurance, Inc., pending this 
appea1. 
FN2 Additionally, plaintiff's argument that Mr. Settles extended his 
health insurance coverage creating a new contract which was not an 
employment benefit and therefore not covered by ERISA was not raised 
below. Consequently, we do not consider it on appeal. See Curtis 
Ambulance v. Shawnee, 811 F.2d 1371, 1386 (10th Cir. 1987). 
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•^ plaintiff's suit failed to state any claim upon which relief could be 
granted under Kansas law. i 
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